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Abstract We report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic in-
tegrated assessment models that explore the stability and performance of international coali-
tions for climate change mitigation. We identify robust results concerning the incentives of
different nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement and estimate the extent of
greenhouse gas mitigation that can be achieved by stable agreements. We also assess the
potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation to foster the stability of cli-
mate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we
find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much
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of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooper-
ation. This more positive message follows from the use of appropriate transfer schemes that
are designed to counteract free riding incentives.
Keywords coalition stability, international environmental agreements, numerical modeling,
transfers
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This paper reports results from a comparison of models that explore international coalitions
for climate policy. These models investigate the incentives of different nations to commit
themselves to a climate agreement and examine the extent to which climate agreements are
stabilized when participation is driven only by the self-interest of its members.
International climate policy suffers from the adverse incentive structure of public good
provision, and it is well known that non-cooperative behavior results in under-provision of
such goods. How much a climate coalition improves upon this dilemma depends on the costs
and benefits of the individual nations. It is particularly dependent on their heterogeneity and
whether nations can compensate each other, i.e. the existence of transfer schemes. In this
paper we investigate this for the first time using an ensemble of five numerical models of
climate coalition formation. Numerical models give particularly valuable insights beyond
those of their analytical counterparts, when the analysis depends on regional heterogeneities
in costs and benefits, quantitative estimates (i.e. their order of magnitude), or detailed rep-
resentations of reaction functions.
The models in this study are diverse both in their modeling approaches and in the data
sources used for calibration, representing a range of estimates for the costs and benefits of
real-world regions and their dynamics. Consequently, the models do not necessarily agree
in their assessment of the stability of specific coalitions.
The aim of this study is to make the differences in the underlying assumptions of costs
and benefits, and their implications for key model results, transparent. We quantify these
differences using new, model independent metrics, and we subsequently ask what these
metrics can contribute to understanding diverging coalition stability results and the effect of
transfers across the models.
Early theoretical investigations of coalition stability have often begun with the assump-
tion of identical (symmetric) players. This has resulted in a pessimistic assessment of the
scope of self-enforcing agreements to improve cooperation on international environmen-
tal issues. In their seminal paper Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) find stable coalitions to be
generally small in size. While stable coalitions may be large in the model setup of Barrett
(1994), this only holds if the gains from cooperation are small. Much of the ensuing research
has investigated this dilemma and ways around it.1
The theoretical potential for transfer payments to increase participation and environ-
mental performance of a coalition has been long known (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). Yet
when real world heterogeneity is included, transfers that do not consider strategic implica-
tions are unlikely to improve an agreement and may even damage its success (Weikard et al
2006; Nagashima et al 2009). In contrast, transfers designed specifically to make coopera-
tion more attractive than the free-riding alternative greatly improve the success of coalitions
1 For a survey of this literature see Finus (2008), Eyckmans (2012) and Benchekroun and Long (2012).
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(Carraro et al 2006; Nagashima et al 2009; Weikard 2009). Similarly, McGinty (2007) shows
the beneficial effect of such transfers within the modeling framework of Barrett (1994).
Regardless of the design of transfers, the asymmetries in the costs and benefits of climate
policy are shown to be important for the achievement of cooperation. Barrett (2001) stresses
that asymmetry of players complements the effect of transfers; together, asymmetry and
transfers may well improve cooperation. Weikard (2009) shows that higher levels of partici-
pation under transfers that target the free-riding incentive are spurred by stronger asymmetry
among the coalition members, including the possibility of full cooperation. Fuentes-Albero
and Rubio (2010) confirm this and show that differences in marginal damages (rather than
abatement costs or the level of damages) are key to this result. Recently Karp and Simon
(2013) obtained comprehensive results showing how the functional specification of costs
and benefits of abatement impacts on the equilibrium coalition size.
While these studies firmly establish a more optimistic prospect for cooperation and high-
light the importance of heterogeneity, the degree of asymmetry often remains a conceptual
assumption. Notable exceptions are Carraro et al (2006) and Nagashima et al (2009), which
rely on integrated assessment models to quantify asymmetries.
To improve the understanding of real-world asymmetries, both the mechanics and the
calibration of the models are of central importance. However, the uncertainties are large,
both within each model (most prominently concerning model parameters) and between mod-
els (concerning model structure). Previously, the issue of how uncertainty and the prospect
of future learning about climate change impacts affects international cooperation, has been
addressed by including uncertainty in the structure of the coalition formation game (Kolstad
and Ulph 2008, 2011; Finus and Pintassilgo 2013). In this paper, uncertainty is reflected in
the diversity of assumptions of the models compared. The strength is threefold: it makes
uncertainty more transparent; it helps identify robust results across modeling assumptions
and parameterizations; and it enables us to learn from the differences.
Our contribution is a better understanding of the well-known cooperation failure, par-
ticularly in the heterogeneous setting provided by these numerical models. In addition, we
identify transfers and assess their magnitude and direction when used as a tool to enhance
cooperation.
1.2 International Climate Agreements
Central to this study is the concept of “self-enforcing agreements” or “coalition stability”. A
climate coalition is a subset of the world’s regions that agree to cooperate on climate change
mitigation policies. More specifically, we assume that within the coalition, climate change
is addressed in an efficient manner, i.e. in a manner that maximizes coalitional welfare.2 The
coalition adopts a joint climate policy and interacts with the remaining regions as a single
player. Each player is assumed to act selfishly with respect to the others.
Coalition formation is hence modeled as a game with two stages: a “participation stage
game,” where players decide to either become members of the coalition or to remain outside;
and an “emission stage game” where players choose economic strategies which (directly or
indirectly) determine the emissions and abatement of greenhouse gases. Strategies therefore
result from a combination of the membership decision in the first stage and the economic
2 Most models implement Pareto-efficiency through maximization of the utilitarian sum of individual wel-
fare per region. MICA computes Pareto-efficient strategies by solving a competitive equilibrium on interna-
tional commodity markets with full internalization of the climate change externality.
4 Kai Lessmann et al.
strategies of the players in the second stage of the game.3 This setup is similar to the Partial
Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) concept introduced by Chander and Tulkens (1995).
The equilibrium concept in stage 1 is cartel stability (d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz
1986) in all models. A coalition is considered “stable” if it satisfies two conditions. First, it
is internally stable, meaning that no member is willing to leave the coalition. Second it is
externally stable, meaning that all non-members prefer to remain singletons.4 Formally, any
given coalition S is stable if for the payoff of player i facing coalition S, pii(S), we have:
pii(S)≥ pii(S\{i}) for all i ∈ S, pi j(S)≥ pi j(S∪{ j}) for all j /∈ S (1)
Cartel stability allows us to analyze the whole range of partial cooperation. Note that the
notion of “core stability” was simultaneously developed for this class of models (Chander
and Tulkens 1995). Core stability derives directly from classical cooperative game theory.
Its specific properties are quite different from those of cartel stability so its analysis is left
for future research but the tools that facilitate this model comparison are also applicable
to core stability, see Kornek et al (2014) and footnote 13. We refer the interested reader to
Bréchet et al (2011) who take a comparative look at both concepts.
Thus building solely on cartel stability, we aim to explore the drivers of cooperation. In
particular we also examine the effects of transfer schemes on the prospects for cooperation.
To investigate transfers, we employ the concept of potential internal stability (PIS, as defined
in Carraro et al 2006). A coalition is said to satisfy the PIS property if a transfer scheme
exists that can redistribute payoffs within the coalition such that the coalition is internally
stable. Formally, PIS requires the existence of a vector of transfers τi with ∑i τi = 0 such
that:
pii(S)+ τi ≥ pii(S\{i}) for all i ∈ S (2)
Note that simple addition of transfers is only appropriate in models with transferable
utility. For models that do not assume transferable utility but feature a transferable com-
modity (e.g. consumption), transfers can be implemented at the commodity level. Here, a
transfer scheme consists of a redistribution of the commodity between regions for each time
period.5
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. An overview of the different integrated
assessment models used in this analysis is given in section 2. Section 3 focuses on the role
of transfers. Section 4 summarizes results and concludes.
2 Characterization of the Models
In all models in this study, economic strategies are derived with respect to climate change
mitigation from a dynamic optimization framework. Each model combines the two level
game described above with an integrated climate economy model in the second stage. These
models are solved numerically, and thus their parameters need to be calibrated. Reflecting
3 The strategy set in stage 2 depends on the specific features of the models. These range from choosing
abatement directly to the indirect approach of choosing to invest in a broad variety of capital stocks (including
energy and abatement technologies). See the appendix for details.
4 This notion of cartel stability was first applied to international environmental agreements by Hoel (1992),
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and Barrett (1994).
5 We apply the procedure thus outlined for the models MICA, WITCH and RICE, for details see Kornek
et al (2014).
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uncertainty in knowledge over climate change economics, calibration varies with the dif-
ferent empirical estimates of costs and benefits of climate change abatement used for the
specific models. More detailed information on the models can be found in appendix A;
model equations are documented in Online Resource 1.
In the Stability of Coalitions model (STACO) each region’s monetary payoff equals re-
gional benefits (avoided damages) less costs of abatement (Nagashima et al 2009, 2011). The
time dependence of both benefits and costs is calculated through an approximation of a Ram-
sey type growth model (Ramsey 1928). STACO does not model the consumption/savings
decision endogenously. Instead it uses exogenous baseline projections for economic devel-
opment and carbon emissions.
The other four models determine each region’s payoff through the use of dynamic, long-
term, perfect foresight, Ramsey-type optimal growth models which determine savings be-
havior and abatement endogenously.
The first multi-region economic-climate model following this approach was RICE (Nord-
haus and Yang 1996) and we use an updated version in this study (Yang 2008). RICE ex-
amines the relationship between economic growth, greenhouse gas emissions and climate
change by explicitly modeling the stock of emissions in the atmosphere and the resulting
global temperature.
Closely related to this is the ClimNeg World Simulation (CWS) model, a modified ver-
sion of the RICE model, updated with new data on its cost and damage parameters (Ey-
ckmans and Tulkens 2003; Eyckmans and Finus 2006; Bréchet et al 2011). As one of its
prominent distinctions, the payoff in CWS is in monetary units rather than an abstract utility
metric, which facilitates an implementation of transfer payments at the payoff level.
The Model of International Climate Agreements (MICA) follows the same economic
framework as RICE but with different assumptions about costs and benefits. Formally, its
main distinction is to include the international goods markets (Lessmann et al 2009; Less-
mann and Edenhofer 2011; Kornek et al 2013).
The aforementioned models rely on stylized abatement cost functions to model emis-
sions reductions. In contrast, WITCH incorporates an explicit representation of mitigation
options, particularly in the energy system (Bosetti et al 2006). With this level of detail comes
a trade-off: the higher computational complexity necessitates the use of selected coalitions.
2.1 Non-cooperative and fully cooperative solutions
The modeling assumptions, model structures, and data sources of the five models reflect
quite different views of the world economy and its development (see Table 1). A key dif-
ference between the models is the way they value the present against the future. For mone-
tary values such as abatement costs or climate change damages, this is determined by each
models’ endogenous interest rate. Simple Ramsey models suggest that this interest rate de-
pends on the pure rate of time preference and, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion is strictly positive, on consumption growth. This follows from the Keynes-Ramsey rule
c˙/c = 1/η (r−ρ) with per capita consumption c and c˙ its derivative with respect to time,
and two preference parameters: the elasticity of marginal utility η and pure rate of time pref-
erence ρ . At the interest rate r households are indifferent between one unit now or (1+ r)
units later. Table 1 (top section) shows how models differ in their preference parameters.
Together with assumed projections of technological progress, these preference parame-
ters determine the growth rates of economic output (Table 1, middle section) which range
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from 1.2 percent to 2.1 percent per year over the first century. The pure rate of time prefer-
ence is highest for MICA, WITCH, and RICE at 3 percent, which has a direct consequence
on the interest rates in these models (around 5 percent).6 For these models, all costs and
benefits occurring in the future will be discounted at this higher rate. For STACO, the pure
rate of time preference is lower (at 1.5 percent) but the (exogenous) assumption of rela-
tively strong growth in the coming decades leads to a high initial discount rate, especially
for emerging economies, which declines over time to values of around 3 percent, giving an
average of 4.2 percent. Finally, in CWS the interest rate, at 1.5 percent, is the same as the
pure rate of time preference, which is the lowest of all the models.
A non-cooperative equilibrium is one where no coalition forms. In the non-cooperative
equilibrium, greenhouse gas emissions are of the same order of magnitude in all models,
with moderately lower values in MICA and RICE. As regional damages are internalized
in the non-cooperative equilibrium, emissions are lower compared to a hypothetical case
without damages. We measure these emission reductions relative to a no damage business-
as-usual scenario (BAU) and find that they are of comparable magnitude in 4 out of 5 models
(about 10 percent of emissions), and 5 percent in RICE.
In the cooperative solution for the grand coalition, emissions are substantially lower
than those in the non-cooperative equilibrium (Table 1, bottom section). This is again with
the exception of RICE, which is probably due to the extent of climate change damages.
In the other models, emission reductions bring down climate change damages by several
percentage points in 2100. In STACO and WITCH in particular, high damages occurring in
the non-cooperative equilibrium are reduced by about four percentage points. In contrast, the
formation of the grand coalition in RICE leaves climate change damages almost unchanged.
When we derive a metric for damages in the next sections, we will see that damage estimates
are indeed relatively low in RICE.
2.2 Cost/benefit information
In this section, we introduce two metrics to characterize the severity of climate change dam-
ages and abatement costs in the models, both globally and on the regional scale. Perhaps
the most intuitive metric would be to compare marginal cost functions and marginal damage
functions. Unfortunately this information is not easy to extract from, or make comparable
between, the models. Instead we propose alternative metrics based on model output rather
than assumptions regarding functional forms and parameter values.
Measuring marginal climate change damages
Figure 1 compares aggregate discounted damages in the non-cooperative equilibrium across
the models. The figure highlights that the damage calibration is low in RICE, also reflected
in the relatively low carbon price in the cooperative solution; the average price in 2100 is
208 $/tC compared to a range from 369 to 966 $/tC in the other models (Table 1).7
In order to compare the marginal damages from climate change between regions for
each model, we take a slightly different approach to that provided by the total damages
shown in Figure 1. Instead, we say that a region has high marginal damages if the carbon
6 To be precise, the pure rates of time preference are constant in RICE and MICA, but diminish in WITCH
from an initial 3 percent to 2 percent over the course of a century.
7 Technically, the STACO model only considers benefits from abatement, and payoffs do not depend on
the level of damages.
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Table 1 Modeling assumptions and key numbers of non-cooperative equilibrium and fully cooper-
ative solution
Modeling assumptions MICA STACO CWS WITCH RICE
Initial year 2005 2011 2000 2005 2000
Time Horizon (years) 190 95a 330 145 245
Number of regions 11 12 6 13 6
Pure rate of time preference (percent) 3.0 1.5 b 1.5 3.0 3.0
Elast. of marginal utility 1.0 1.0 b 0.0 1.0 1.0
Non-cooperative equilibrium MICA STACO CWS WITCH RICE
Mean GDP growth ratec 2.06 1.97 1.54 1.56 1.24
Mean interest ratec,d 5.26 4.17 1.50 5.35 4.98
GHG emissions (GtC) 2015-2100 1516 1827 1754 1963 1404
Non-cooperative GHG reductions (percent)e 9.8 12.1 10.2 13.0 5.0
Mean GHG intensity (GtC/tn$) 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.13
Climate change damage in 2100 (percent)f 5.8 7.8 3.2 9.3 1.6
Carbon price 2100: reg. mean ($/tC) 12 89 49 38 8
Cooperative solution MICA STACO CWS WITCH RICE
GHG emissions (GtC) 2015-2100 953 984 1094 1122 1242
Climate change damage in 2100 (percent)f 3.8 4.0 1.9 4.9 1.5
Carbon price 2100: reg. mean ($/tC) 369 966 529 858 208
Carbon price growth rate to 2100 (percent) 1.90 1.69 0.90 1.02 1.02
a In STACO, climate change damages are considered for a 300 year period.
b STACO derives the interest rate for discounting payoffs using the Keynes-Ramsey rule to
ensure consistency with a logarithmic utility function and a pure rate of 1.5 percent
c Using a time horizon of 100 years
d The endogenous rate at which monetary values are discounted in the model, averaged over
regions and time
e Emission reduction in the non-cooperative equilibrium relative to a business-as-usual scenario
without climate change damages
f Damages are reported as a share of 2100 economic product
0
20
40
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80
100
MICA STACO CWS WITCH RICE
Discounted sum of damages (2015-2100) in trillion 2005 USD
Fig. 1 Aggregate damages 2015–2100 in the non-cooperative equilibrium in trillion US$, discounted at the
model specific discount rates
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price of the grand coalition is significantly reduced when the region in question leaves. The
impact on the coalitional carbon price is a good indicator of how much the region is affected
by climate change; this region’s damages are reflected in the carbon price if and only if the
region is part of the coalition.
We take the discounted sum of this carbon price difference for each region in the grand
coalition compared to the sub-coalition when the one region in question is leaving, and
average the differences. Taking the average only matters when coalitions do not establish a
uniform carbon price, which is the case for WITCH and RICE. We normalize this metric to
the maximal difference over all regions (Figure 2).
Each model yields a different distribution of marginal damages across regions. In partic-
ular there is no agreement between the models about the region incurring highest marginal
damages. This reflects the fact that the assumptions made by the models about the regional
distribution of damages differ greatly. These differences concerning the marginal damage
assumptions are a primary driver of the results of the comparison.
Measuring regional marginal abatement costs
For our metric of regional abatement costs, we look at the cumulative emissions reduction
in each region at a uniform carbon price. Higher emissions reductions at such a global car-
bon price signal a flatter marginal abatement cost curve up to this point, and hence lower
abatement costs for a prescribed abatement target. Since high figures indicate low marginal
costs, we talk about this metric as being the region’s “abatement potential”.
Technically, all models implement the common carbon price scenario by imposing the
same global emissions tax trajectory under conditions of disabled climate change damages.
The cumulative abatement is the absolute emissions reduction, summed over each model’s
time horizon.
We find the global abatement potential to be largest in case of MICA, followed by
WITCH, STACO, CWS, and RICE in declining order. Only about two thirds of the abate-
ment prescribed by MICA are achieved in RICE. Despite this, we see that the potential and
hence abatement costs are of the same order of magnitude in all five models.
Figure 2 shows the abatement potential indicator for each model. The abatement po-
tential indicator is the tax scenario normalized to the maximum abatement level over all
regions. The indicator shows that China and India always rank high on abatement potential
while for Japan the mitigation costs are perceived to be amongst the highest. We will use
the information from this table extensively when discussing the main objectives of this pa-
per: incentives of specific regions to join a climate agreement and the characterization of
transfers. In general, one can say that the models seem to be in good agreement over their
assumptions on the costs of abatement.
2.3 Incentives of regions
The incentive to remain in a coalition (or in short: incentive to stay) is defined as the payoff
received as a member of a given coalition minus the payoff of being outside the coalition
(i.e. as a free-riding non-member). For the following discussion, we want to structure the
driving forces that determine the incentive to stay for a given region in the following way:
1. First, the benefit of joining the coalition, which is in turn influenced by:
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Fig. 2 Climate change damages and abatement potential indicators scaled to [−1,1]. The climate change
marginal damage indicator for a particular region was calculated by taking the average of the difference
in discounted carbon prices of the grand coalition and the grand coalition minus the particular region at
hand. This indicator was normalized relative to the maximum average difference over all regions. Abatement
potential was calculated by implementing a common carbon tax trajectory for all regions in every model. The
resulting abatement trajectory (measured in tons) was integrated over each model’s time horizon and scaled
according to the maximum abatement level. Model regions are specified in appendix.
(a) the extent of climate change damages in this region. When a region joins the coali-
tion, any damages it incurs are henceforth internalized by all coalition members.
Thus, the higher the marginal damages in the joining region, the greater the abate-
ment of the coalition as a whole. Any region benefits from such additional abate-
ment, and this is particularly pronounced for a region with high marginal damage.
(b) the response of non-members. For example, the free-riding non-members are likely
to raise their emissions in reaction to the reduced emissions of the coalition. Such
“leaked” emissions offset the abatement of the coalition and therefore reduce the
benefit of joining such a coalition.
2. Second, the additional costs incurred by the region upon joining the coalition. We distin-
guish the abatement costs of a coalition member and other opportunity costs as follows:
(a) abatement costs are a result of the distribution of emission reductions which are
determined by efficiency in abatement (i.e. the lower the marginal costs, the more a
region needs to abate), and the overall ambition of the coalition, which depends on
the collective marginal climate change damages of all coalition members.
(b) other opportunity costs emerge when regions are coupled through more channels
than just the externality. For example, when carbon pricing affects the world de-
mand for fossil resources, price changes in such resources will represent a cost of
participating in the coalition for net exporters of such fuels.
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Fig. 3 Carbon price in the OECD coalition (as average net present value). Percentages indicate how climate
change damages in the member regions contribute to the overall carbon price.
The extent of 1a and 2a in the models is covered by the indicators derived above and
summarized in Figure 2 . We will see that often these indicators suffice to understand model
behavior. Before we take a look at the incentives, we discuss how damages, abatement and
leakage vary by considering the OECD coalition. For our purposes, all regions generating
at least half their economic output from OECD countries are considered members of this
coalition.
Distribution of Damages
The extent to which a region benefits from abatement is measured through the carbon price
(see discussion of Figure 2). Figure 3 reports the percentage decrease in abatement price
when a nation leaves the OECD coalition.8
The absolute level of the carbon price, given above each bar, shows the ambition in the
coalition’s emissions reductions across the models. In the case of the STACO model, the
OECD coalition combines regions with high damages. This makes the carbon price of this
coalition very high, and free-riding on this coalition’s abatement very attractive. In contrast,
the ambition of the OECD coalition and hence the incentive to free-ride is much lower in
MICA.
There is reasonable agreement across the models that it is the USA and Europe9 which
contribute the most to damages: they both score highly in every model. The USA and Europe
would therefore gain much from the abatement undertaken by the coalition. Their share of
coalitional abatement must, of course, be taken into account to determine the incentive of
these regions.
8 Since marginal damages are not entirely flat in any of the models but STACO, this procedure is just an
approximation of the decomposition of the cooperative carbon price but since the abatement of the OECD
coalition is unambitious and leakage is small, the error is negligible.
9 Specifically, we will refer to model regions EUR, EU, and OLDEURO as “Europe”.
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Fig. 4 Allocation of emission reductions in the OECD coalition as percentages of overall emissions reduc-
tion, the time horizon is one century.
Distribution of Abatement
There are many ways to distribute overall abatement amongst the members of climate coali-
tions, guided by many criteria, e.g. pragmatic, normative or incentive compatible. The de-
fault distribution in coalition models is normative: the maximization of coalition welfare.10
We follow this approach.
Figure 4 shows that the OECD coalition’s total abatement over the first century is quite
different across the models, partly because the composition of the coalition is different be-
tween models. However, since differences turn out to be large even when regions are iden-
tical, we conclude that much of the variation in abatement allocation is due to different cost
and benefit assumptions.
The distribution of abatement for a given country varies substantially across the models.
For example, the USA share falls anywhere within the range of 20-60 percent, that of Japan
between 1 and 18 percent, and for Europe within the range 10-30 percent. All models agree
that the largest share of abatement ought to be achieved in the USA, often followed by
Europe.11
Leakage Emissions
Carbon emissions are said to “leak” out of the climate coalition if non-members increase
their emissions in response to the coalition’s abatement. The amount of leakage depends
on the sensitivity of the reaction functions of nations not in the coalition. These reaction
functions depend largely on model features that determine the ways in which non-members
are affected by the coalition.
10 Some models use a weighted sum in the social welfare function, see model factsheets in the appendix.
11 In MICA, the largest share falls onto the rest-of-the-world (ROW) region, which includes several non-
OECD countries.
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Fig. 5 Incentive to stay in the OECD coalition, calculated as the difference between inside and outside payoff
and scaled to the gap in global aggregated payoff between non-cooperative equilibrium (=0) and cooperative
solution for grand coalition (=100). The inset tables list the regional indicators of climate change damages
and abatement potential, denoted “D” and “A”, respectively.
There is zero leakage in STACO. This is a consequence of assuming constant marginal
damages, which implies that abatement is chosen independently by each region. In all other
models, the regions react to the abatement decisions of the others. MICA, CWS, and RICE
show only very moderate leakage: leakage rates per region are less than one percent of the
coalition’s abatement (not shown).
Regions in WITCH show the strongest free-riding behavior in terms of leakage, with to-
tal leakage rates of 16 percent of the OECD’s coalition abatement (not shown). In WITCH,
the coalition affects non-members through an additional channel: energy markets (see Bosetti
and De Cian 2013, for details). The coalition’s abatement effort drives down oil prices and
free-riders increase their consumption of the carbon-intensive oil grades in particular.
Overall incentives
The interplay of all the drivers discussed above jointly shapes the incentive to join or leave
a given coalition. We consider the OECD coalition and the grand coalition in turn.
Figure 5 shows the incentive to stay inside the OECD coalition for its members. If the
incentive to stay was positive for all members, the coalition would be internally stable with-
out transfers. Conversely, the figure shows which regions are responsible when the OECD
coalition fails to be internally stable in any of the models. For easy reference, the indicators
of abatement potential and climate change damages from Figure 2 are repeated in Figure 5.
While the models all agree that the OECD coalition is not internally stable, each model
suggests that different regions want to leave the coalition. For example, the USA would sup-
port the OECD coalition in MICA and CWS, but would not support it in STACO, WITCH,
or RICE.
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In general, low abatement potential and high marginal damages have a positive effect
on the incentive to stay. Low abatement potential indicates a steep marginal abatement cost
function and therefore a low mitigation burden. High marginal damages indicate that a re-
gion will benefit much from increased coalitional abatement.
According to this logic, the incentives for Europe appear relatively simple: in all models
Europe is a coalition member characterized by relatively high marginal damages and low
abatement potential. Such players have much to gain from cooperation, but have low costs
as their share of the mitigation burden is small. The models therefore agree that Europe
would want to remain in the OECD coalition.
This is not the case for the USA, which has a strong motivation to defect from the
OECD coalition. This is because the USA’s estimated abatement potential is high, which
means that the USA would carry a large share of the emission reductions in the coalition. In
fact three of the models find that the USA would not support the OECD coalition (STACO,
WITCH, and RICE). In MICA and CWS however, the costs are more than compensated
for by large benefits. In these models the USA incur the highest marginal damages of all
coalition members and thus have an incentive to remain in the coalition. It also helps that in
these two models the ambition level of the OECD coalition is low, resulting in a low burden
for its members as most high marginal damage regions are outside the OECD coalition.
Japan is modeled as a single country region in three of the five models. The models
unanimously see little abatement potential in Japan alone, mainly due to the relatively small
size of its economy. Thus Japan would carry only a small burden, which makes it better
off inside the coalition in MICA and STACO. In CWS, the estimated marginal damages are
also very low for Japan. Japan can therefore defect (and save on abatement costs) without
substantially lowering the ambition level of the coalition, which turns out to be preferred by
Japan. The larger Canada/Japan/New Zealand aggregate region of WITCH incurs substan-
tial abatement costs, tipping the balance towards defection as marginal damages are only
average compared to the other OECD players.
Moving to the grand coalition, positive net incentives to stay become rare (not shown).
This is a consequence of more ambitious emission reductions in this coalition, which places
a larger burden on all members. The few exceptions are either of the high damage/low burden
type discussed above (e.g. Japan and Europe in STACO, and Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) in
WITCH) or very large players (ROW in CWS and RICE). The latter aggregate much of the
world’s damages and abatement potential due to their sheer size.
In WITCH, net revenues from trade in oil are part of the region’s income and an addi-
tional driver of incentives. Coalitions that strongly abate emissions consume substantially
less oil leading to a drop in prices. In turn, this increases the outsiders’ consumption. There-
fore oil-rich regions, while cutting their own oil consumption when joining the coalition,
receive large revenues. Interestingly, the model shows that extraction does not change very
much and the price differences are only minor. However, the pattern of consumption changes
between different grades of oil, leading to increased exports of low carbon intensive grades.
The top three regions showing the strongest increase in oil revenues prefer to stay in the
grand coalition.12 This effect is negative for the regions Canada/Japan/New Zealand and
South Korea/South Africa/Australia.
12 Model regions Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Non-EU Eastern Europe (TE), and Sub Saharan
Africa (SSA).
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Table 2 Stable coalitions for internal/external stability and potential internal stability.
Model Concepta Number stable Max. size Max. abat.b Max. welf.c
MICA
IES 1 (0.05%) 3 0.06 0.09
IS 54 (2.64%) 4 0.17 0.24
PISe 481 (23.50%) 6 0.31 0.47
STACO
IES 1 (0.02%) 2 0.03 0.03
IS 23 (0.56%) 2 0.07 0.07
PIS 2130 (52.01%) 9 0.59 0.68
CWS
IES 1 (1.59%) 2 0.67 0.77
IS 5 (7.94%) 2 0.67 0.77
PIS 55 (87.30%) 6 1.00 1.00
WITCHd
IES 1 2 0.03 0.05
IS 1 2 0.03 0.05
PISe,f 5 4 0.17 0.38
RICE
IES 0 (0.00%)
IS 3 (4.76%) 2 0.03 0.06
PISe,f 7 (11.11%) 2 0.12 0.11
a Stability concepts are abbreviated IES (internal/external stability), IS (internal sta-
bility), and PIS (potential internal stability)
b The maximum global abatement achieved by a coalition is measured by the closing
the gap indicator from 0=non-cooperative equilibrium to 1=cooperative solution for
the grand coalition.
c Maximum global welfare is measured by the closing the gap indicator.
d In WITCH, only seven selected coalitions were analyzed.
e In order to determine the PIS-property, the maximization procedure described in
Kornek et al (2014) was employed.
f For the maximization procedure, the discount-rate was held fixed at the level of the
PANE-solution.
3 Transfers
3.1 Stable coalitions
In this section, we compare two stability concepts without transfers (internal/external sta-
bility, IES, and internal stability, IS) with potential internal stability (PIS).13 Table 2 shows
the number of stable coalitions for each stability concept, along with maximum coalition
size, maximum abatement achieved and maximum welfare achieved. For the latter two mea-
sures, we use the “closing the gap” indicator to characterize the performance of coalitions.
This indicator relates global emission reductions and welfare to the gap between the non-
cooperative equilibrium – set to zero – and to the cooperative solution for the grand coalition,
set to unity (cf. Eyckmans and Finus 2007).
We find coalitions that are internally/externally stable to be small and achieve little,
which is in line with existing literature. CWS is an interesting exception: the best inter-
nally/externally stable coalition achieves 77 percent of the global welfare gains of the grand
coalition. This is due to the very large region ROW which enables a two player coalition to
abate a large share of global emissions. The best performing coalition that does not include
ROW achieves a closing the gap indicator for welfare of only 21 percent.
13 These are the most commonly used concepts for this set of models in previous studies. The analysis
could be extended to include blocking power (or core stability) which, for the sake of brevity, we leave for
future work.
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Table 3 Permit allocation schemes. The permit allocation for a coalition S is determined as follows: each
member i of S receives qit = ωit ·Qt where Qt = ∑ j∈S e jt are the available permits within S. Population,
emissions and economic product are abbreviated pop, e, and y. Non-cooperative equilibrium is abbreviated
NC, business-as-usual ND. The schemes are taken from Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006)
Scheme Distribution key
Egalitarian ωit = popit/∑ j∈S pop jt
Grandfathering ωit = ei,t0/∑ j∈S e j,t0
Quota Nash ωit = eNCit /∑ j∈S e
NC
jt
Quota BAU ωit = eNDit /∑ j∈S e
ND
jt
Historic responsibility ωit =
(
eNDi,t0
)−1
/∑ j∈S
(
eNDj,t0
)−1
Ability to pay ωit = (yit/popit)
−1 /∑ j∈S (yit/popit)
−1
Ability to pollute ωit = (eit/popit)
−1 /∑ j∈S (eit/popit)
−1
Energy efficiency ωit = (eit/yit)−1 /∑ j∈S (eit/yit)
−1
When we focus on internal stability alone, more coalitions are stable, and their per-
formance improves. We highlight two observations: first, participation remains almost un-
changed (with the exception of an increase from 3 to 4 players in one model, MICA); sec-
ond, the performance improvement when ignoring external stability is substantial for some
models, and negligible in others.
Turning to coalitions with PIS, the transfers implicit in this concept have a strong effect:
the number of stable coalitions increases by 1-2 orders of magnitude. The corresponding
improvement in the closing the gap indicator is also large. The CWS model even finds the
grand coalition to have the PIS property. In MICA, STACO, and WITCH, PIS transfers
improve the closing the gap indicator from single digit values to values roughly half that of
the grand coalition (47, 68, and 38 percent, respectively). In STACO, the coalition with PIS
generating the highest global welfare is not only internally stable after receiving the implied
transfers but is also externally stable.14
Thus, the model comparison shows that transfers exist that make it possible to stabilize
coalitions that substantially close the welfare gap. This is a considerably more optimistic
message than the traditional conclusion derived from analytical models so far. With our
multi-model approach, we conclude that this claim is robust with respect to modeling ap-
proaches and parameterizations.
3.2 Transfers and stable coalitions
The PIS transfers in the preceding section are determined by stability considerations. In
contrast, transfers based on conventional burden sharing rules (Table 3) are designed to be
either equitable or pragmatic. How does this departure from incentive compatibility affect
the ability of conventional burden sharing schemes to induce stable coalitions?
To evaluate how burden sharing affects stability of coalitions, we convert permit alloca-
tions to monetary transfers using the carbon price of the coalition. The monetary transfers
are added either to the consumption streams or payoff (in case of CWS and STACO).15
14 Technically, this is because the STACO model is characterized by superadditivity, which means that the
total worth of a group of players involved in a merger does not decrease, see Eyckmans et al (2013) for details.
15 In two models, there is no single carbon price within the coalition (WITCH and RICE) because maxi-
mization of social welfare for the coalition balances marginal value of emissions in terms of utility but not
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In a first look at the implications of the conventional transfer schemes, we analyze how
a selection of four schemes from Table 3 affects internal stability. Table 4 shows the number
of internally stable coalitions under these transfers and how this number changes in relation
to the scenario without transfers.
The main conclusion is that transfer schemes that were designed without coalition sta-
bility in mind have an almost unanimously adverse effect on stability. This is evident from
the decrease in the number of internally stable coalitions (cf. the almost exclusively negative
numbers in the column ∆coal). An exception is “grandfathering” in CWS.
In Table 5 we compare two additional statistics of the conventional transfer schemes to
the PIS-transfers to investigate the poor performance of conventional transfer schemes. The
first column of each model shows the share of members of coalitions with PIS where the
direction of transfers coincides with PIS transfers i.e. regions that need a positive transfer
are receivers. By definition, PIS transfers reach the perfect score of 100 percent and other
transfers score lower.
We find that most conventional transfer schemes stay well below 100 percent for this in-
dicator and often around 50 percent or lower. Most models find that specific transfer schemes
do better; however, the models disagree on which transfer scheme performs best.
The second column displays the average flow of money between the regions across
the ensemble. Models agree that the stability-enhancing PIS-transfers need relatively small
flows of money. Of the other schemes, transfers for “quota BAU” and “grandfathering”
are roughly in the same order of magnitude. These two schemes often also score high on
the direction indicator. In the other transfers schemes, more money is transferred than is
necessary for internal stability.
Thus, we have identified two problems of the conventional transfer schemes with respect
to their negative effect on stability, namely the direction of the induced transfers and their
magnitude.
To investigate how PIS transfers depend on the properties of coalition members, we
relate properties of coalition members to the frequency with which they receive a positive
transfer. The results are found in Table 6.
We find significant agreement between the models regarding the relationship between
damages and transfers. The more damages a region incurs from climate change, the more
likely it is that this region has a surplus to share with other members, i.e. PIS transfers
will be negative. We find no significant correlation between transfers and either abatement
potential or abatement per unit damage, although the results do indicate that in most cases
the direction of the relationship is the same.
4 Summary and Conclusions
We have compared five different models to explore the stability and performance of inter-
national coalitions for climate change mitigation in a setting where regional heterogene-
ity reflects real-world asymmetries of regions. To facilitate comparison of the impact of
modeling assumptions on the costs and benefits of mitigation we developed two indicators
measuring, first, the regional abatement potential and, second, regional exposure to climate
change damages. While the models’ estimates for abatement potentials are in agreement for
monetary units. This is different in MICA (where international trade balances marginal utility of consump-
tion) and CWS (which uses a linear utility function). In WITCH and RICE, we instead use the social cost
of carbon for the conversion (computed as the marginal utility of carbon inside the coalition divided by the
marginal utility of average per-capita consumption inside the coalition).
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Table 6 Characterization of PIS transfers with properties of players. We show the
correlation coefficients of the percentage of coalitions in which a player receives
positive transfers to this player’s abatement potential and damages indicators and
their ratio. The significance of the one-sided correlation is indicated with a “*”
for the p=0.05 level and a “**” for the p=0.01 level.
Percentage of positive transfer received
Abatement Potential Damages Damages/ Abatement
MICA −0.502 −0.802∗∗ −0.593
STACO 0.250 −0.960∗∗ −0.827∗∗
CWS −0.857∗ −0.914∗ −0.114
WITCH 0.499 0.273 0.078
RICE −0.014 −0.186 −0.357
key world regions, we find substantial differences in the climate change damage estimates
that the models produce for certain regions. To a large extent, the differences reflect the
variations in the literature sources upon which the model parameterizations are based, and
therefore they reflect the uncertainty over costs and benefits of climate change mitigation in
the literature (cf. Metz et al 2007).
It is therefore not surprising that the models differ in their assessment of whether certain
coalitions are stable, and whether certain world regions or nations have an incentive to be
members of a given coalition. A notable exception is the assessment of the EU, for which
all the models unanimously attest an incentive to support a coalition of OECD countries.
However, when we turn from the identity of the players to their cost-benefit characteristics
in terms of the two indicators suggested in this study, the models are remarkably consis-
tent in their predictions. We find that the indicators of a region’s abatement potential and its
exposure to climate change damages substantially reflect its incentives and allow us to un-
derstand its preference for or against membership in a coalition. When regional abatement
potential is low (implying a steep marginal abatement cost function) or regional marginal
climate change damages are high, there is a greater chance for a positive incentive to stay in
a coalition.
In the absence of transfers, all models agree that stable coalitions tend to be small and
achieve little, due to a lack of internal stability of larger, more ambitious coalitions. This is
in accordance with the theoretical literature and therefore not surprising.
Transfers designed to minimize free-riding incentives as far as possible achieve much
more: the models find that coalitions with PIS are substantially larger than internally stable
coalitions and achieve about half or more of what full cooperation would achieve both in
welfare and in terms of greenhouse gas abatement.
In contrast, conventional transfer schemes do not improve cooperation; they often even
undermine existing stable coalitions. The reason is, of course, that conventional transfers
do not reflect incentives; among other things they are frequently too large in magnitude
and transfer wealth in the wrong direction, i.e. regions that need transfers to be convinced
to stay in a coalition are effectively paying regions that have no incentive to defect from
the coalition. Conversely, we conclude that when transfers are designed to take incentives
into account, the financial flows need to be small compared to the cases, for example, of an
allocation based on historic emissions.
Finally, we examine how the properties of coalition members affect the PIS transfers
necessary to stabilize the coalition. We find that players with high damages tend to benefit
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enough from cooperation to allow them to share some of the gains, and thus compensate
those players with high abatement potential that provide the necessary mitigation.
For future research, there are several possible extensions of this analysis. First, our sta-
bility analysis focused on one particular non-cooperative concept (internal/external stability)
but could be extended to alternative game theoretic stability concepts.
Second, we found that on many issues, the different models were remarkably unani-
mous. However, where results were substantially different it could be argued that this is
caused by differences in assumptions. In this paper we preferred to represent a broad range
of possible future economic dynamics. More insights into the modeling details, or the pa-
rameters causing models to diverge in their assessment could, however, be gained by a close
harmonizing of baseline assumptions of the models.
Third, our analysis has stressed that assumptions on climate change damages are very
influential but at the same time highly uncertain. This concerns both the data and the mod-
eling. Additional empirical studies on the economic impact of climate change are badly
needed, and the modeling of climate change damages could be improved beyond the stan-
dard assumption found in the participating models.
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A Appendix: Model Factsheets
Model: MICA (Model of International Climate Agreements), PIK, Germany
Model description: Kornek et al (2013)
Model concept Solution method
Multi-region optimal growth model with climate ex-
ternality and international trade
Competitive equilibrium, full internalization of cli-
mate change damage within the coalition; imple-
mented as non-linear optimization problem solved
with a modified Negishi algorithm
Welfare concept Parametric specification
Discounted utilitarianism in each region, joint welfare
maximization with constant Negishi weights for the
coalition
Pure rate of time preference ρ = 3%, elasticity of
marginal utility η = 1
Markets and Trade Model anticipation
Consumption good Perfect foresight
Number of region: 11
AFR Sub-Saharan Africa without South Africa
CHN China
EUR EU-27
IND India
JPN Japan
LAM All American countries except Canada and the United States
MEA North Africa, Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf countries, resource exporting countries within
the former Soviet Union, and Pakistan
OAS South East Asia, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Nepal, Afghanistan
ROW Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and non-EU27 European states except Russia
RUS Russia
USA United States of America
Base year Time horizon and step
2005 2005–2195, 10 years
Climate Climate change
Greenhouse Gases: CO2 Temperature response model
Carbon dioxide concentration (ppm)
Temperature change (C°)
Mitigation options Climate impacts
Abatement cost function for CO2 based on mitigation
cost information from the REMIND model (Luderer
et al 2013)
Region-specific quadratic damage function in temper-
ature increase
Damage as [%] of GDP based on Fankhauser (1995)
following Finus et al (2006)
Land use Resources considered
— —
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Model: STACO-3 (Stability of Coalitions), Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Model description: Nagashima et al (2011), Dellink et al (2015)
Model concept Solution method
Combined game-theoretic and integrated assessment
model with regional benefits (avoided damages) and
abatement costs of greenhouse gas emissions
Partial agreement Nash equilibrium between signato-
ries and singletons
Welfare concept: Discounted net present value of regional payoff in each region, joint payoff maximization
within coalitions; no full welfare evaluation but the Keynes-Ramsey rule used for discounting payoffs is
consistent with a logarithmic utility function.
Parametric specification:Pure rate of time preference ρ = 1.5%; implicitly η = 1
Markets and Trade Model anticipation
Carbon Trade is modelled as transfers between coali-
tion members
Perfect foresight
Number of region: 12
BRA Brazil
CHN China
EUR EU and EFTA (EU-27, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland)
HIA High-income Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand)
IND India
JPN Japan
MES Middle Eastern countries
OHI Other high income countries (including for example, Australia, Canada and New Zealand)
ROE Rest of Europe
ROW Rest of the world
RUS Russia
USA United States of America
Base year Time horizon and step
2011 2011 - 2106, 5 years
Climate Climate change
Greenhouse Gases: CO2, CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs,
SF6, based on EPPA-5 model to calibrate the regional
GHGs BAU emission paths
CO2-e concentration (ppm)
Radiative Forcing (W/m2)
Temperature change (°C)
Mitigation options: Regional abatement cost functions for GHGs are based on regional cost parameters from
the EPPA model (Morris et al 2008)
Climate impacts: Benefits are calculated as the net present value of the stream of future avoided damages
from a unit of abatement in the current period, taking regional GDP growth and inertia in the climate system
into account (Nagashima et al 2011). This function is calibrated to a simple climate module, based on the
DICE model (Nordhaus 2008), but calibrated on the EPPA-5 model (Paltsev et al 2005; Paltsev 2010). The
linear global benefit function is based on estimates of climate damage by Tol (2009). Benefits are allocated
across regions with a share for each region (Finus et al 2006).
Land use Resources considered
— —
Notes: Exogenous technological change (annual efficiency improvement in abatement costs) is considered to
be 0.5 - 2 % per year (regionally differentiated)
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Model: CWS (ClimNeg World Simulation model, Version 2.0), KU Leuven, Belgium
Model description: Bréchet et al (2011)
Model concept Solution method
Multi-region optimal growth model with climate ex-
ternality, maximization of coalition welfare, internal-
ization of climate externality for coalition members
Nash equilibrium of carbon emission game solved
by tatonnement algorithm between coalition and non-
members
Welfare concept Parametric specification
Discounted utilitarianism in each region, coalition’s
welfare maximization with equal welfare weights for
all members
ρ = 1.5% (constant), η = 0 (linear in consumption)
Markets and Trade Model anticipation
no trade in goods, trade in carbon emission permits
(optional)
Perfect foresight
Number of region: 6
USA: United States of America
JAP: Japan
EU: South East Asia
China: China
FSU: Former Soviet Union
ROW: Rest of the World
Base year Time horizon and step
2000 2000–2310, 10 years
Climate Climate change
Greenhouse Gases: CO2 3-box model of carbon cycle (atmosphere, lower and
upper ocean)
CO2-e concentration (ppm)
Radiative Forcing (W/m2 )
Atmospheric and ocean temperature change (C°)
Mitigation options Climate impacts
Exogenous emission efficiency improvement over
time plus region-specific abatement cost functions
(power functions, exponent 2.887)
Region-specific damage function, power function of
atmospheric temperature change (exponent 3.0), dam-
age as [%] of GDP
Land use Resources considered
– –
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Model: WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model, version 2012), FEEM, Italy
Model description: Bosetti et al (2014)
Model concept Solution method
Hybrid Optimal growth model, including a bottom-up
energy sector and a simple climate model, embedded
in a game theoretic setup
Regional growth models solved by non-linear op-
timization and game theoretic setup solved by
tatonnement algorithm between coalitions and non-
members (Nash equilibrium)
Welfare concept Parametric specification
Discounted Utilitarianism, coalition’s welfare maxi-
mization with equal welfare weights for all members
ρ = 3% decreasing, η = 1 (log of consumption)
Markets and Trade Model anticipation
Oil Perfect foresight
Number of region: 13
CAJAZ: Canada, Japan, New Zeland
CHINA: China, including Taiwan
EASIA: South East Asia
INDIA: India
KOSAU: South Korea, South Africa, Australia
LACA: Latin America, Mexico and Caribbean
MENA: Middle East and North Africa
NEWEURO: EU new countries, CHE, NOR oldeuro: EU old countries (EU-15)
SASIA: South Asia
SSA: Sub Saharan Africa
TE: Non-EU Eastern Europe, including Russia
USA: United States of America
Base year Time horizon and step
2005 2005–2150, 5 years
Climate Climate change
Greenhouse Gases:
CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, CFCs, SFs
Aerosols considered: yes
3-box model of carbon cycle
CO2-e concentration (ppm)
Radiative Forcing (W/m2 )
Temperature change (C°)
Mitigation options Climate impacts
Abatement cost functions for non-CO2 GHGs
Land use
Decarbonization options in the Energy system
(Renewables, Nuclear, Biomass, CCS)
Region-specific damage function with linear and
power function term with exponent 2.2 in the tem-
perature increase Damage as [%] of GDP
Land use Resources considered
Emissions from land use change are considered Coal, Oil, Gas, Uranium, Biomass
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Model: RICE Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy, SUNY Binghampton, USA
Model description Yang (2008)
Model concept Solution method
Multi-region Ramsey-type growth model with joint
production of GHG emission that causes climate ex-
ternality
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium; cooperative so-
lutions under various assumptions of incentive com-
patibilities; coalition solutions (called “hybrid” Nash
equilibria in Yang (2008))
Welfare concept Parametric specification
Discounted sum of regional utility functions. Pure rate of time preference ρ = 3%, elasticity of
marginal utility η = 1
Markets and Trade Model anticipation
- Perfect foresight
Number of region: 6
CHN China
EEC Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union
EU European Union
OHI Other high-income countries
ROW Rest of the world
USA United States of America
Base year Time horizon and step
2000 2000-2245 (5 years)
Climate Climate change
CO2 emissions and other exogenously set GHG emis-
sions
the Schneider box model
Mitigation options Climate impacts
Mitigation cost functions based on Nordhaus and
Yang (1996) and updated with Yang (2008) which
contains updates provided by Nordhaus
Climate damage functions based on Nordhaus and
Yang (1996) and updated with Yang (2008) which
contains updates provided by Nordhaus
Land use Resources considered
exogenously set Availability of fossil fuel resources at global level has
been checked implicitly
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